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Abstract 
This paper investigates implications of some of the well-known behavioral biases of bidders' behavior in different 
types of auctions. It presents the results of an experimental study that tests the endowment hypothesis for English 
auctions and regret aversion hypothesis for first-price sealed-bid auctions. This study documents support for the 
former and no support for the latter hypotheses.
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is substantial evidence that people do not always behave according to the expected utility 
theory and that they are subject to different behavioral biases. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
noted that people are loss averse and are subject to the endowment effect. In particular, they 
attach higher values to the objects they already own than to objects they want to buy. The 
endowment effect is one of the main building blocks of the prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, 1991, and 1992), the most well-known alternatives to the expected utility theory.
1 
Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) use Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) evidence to 
develop the regret theory, another alternative theory of people’s behavior under uncertainty. The 
main assumption of the regret theory is that people who made certain decisions in the past may 
have regrets if these decisions turn out to be wrong even if they appeared correct with 
information available ex ante. This paper presents the results of experimental study of the effect 
of endowment and regret aversion on bidders’ behavior in auctions.  
 
Despite the growing popularity of behavioral economics and numerous research that documents 
the irrationality in bidders’ behavior, scant research has been undertaken to apply the existing 
behavioral theories in the auction contexts to investigate their validity and implications for 
optimal auction design. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) argues that, when bidders do not have 
dominating strategies, they may feel regret when their bidding decisions turn out not to be the 
best ex post (after the end of the auction) even if they were the best decisions based on the 
information available at the time of the bidding. For example, a bidder in a first-price sealed-bid 
auction who values an object at $1,000 and bids only $500 may feel regret (“loser regret”) when 
she learns that the winning bid was only $501 and she could have won by bidding just a little bit 
more. The anticipation of the loser regret makes the bidder bid more aggressively. Similarly, the 
same bidder who bids $500 may feel regret for “money left on the table” (or “winner regret”) if 
she wins the auction and learns that the second largest bid was only $100 and she could have 
won with a much smaller bid. Such anticipated winner regret makes bidders shade their bids in 
first-price sealed-bid auctions. Bidders in descending Dutch auctions are also subject to the loser 
regret, but they are free from the winner regret because the second largest bid does not exist in 
Dutch auctions and the winner never finds out the minimum price at which she could have won 
the auction. Therefore, according to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), the final price in Dutch 
auctions should be higher than in otherwise identical first-price sealed-bid auctions. This is the 
first hypothesis that we test in this paper. 
 
Although bidders’ optimal strategies in both second-price sealed-bid and first-price open-bid 
English auctions are to bid their true values of the object (Vickrey, 1961), and such optimal 
bidding should result in the same outcome (i.e. the same final price and the same winner), the 
different formats of these auctions may result in different bidders’ attitude toward the object. 
Ariely and Simonson (2003) and Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2005) argue that bidders in 
English auctions may feel quasi-endowment effect toward the object for which they are bidding. 
                                                 
1 There is a substantial body of empirical research that documents the endowment effect, which includes but is not 
limited to Kahneman et al. (1990), Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Knetsch  (1989), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).  
For example, if bidder A bids $1,000, she may feel as if she already owns the object and paid 
$1,000 for it. Therefore, if she gets overbid by the next bid of $1,001, she thinks of increasing 
her bid to $1,002, paying just two more dollars for the privilege of keeping the object, whereas 
dropping out of the auction is considered as losing the object and getting the $1,000 back (i.e. 
selling the object for $1,000). According to the quasi-endowment effect, a person may prefer to 
pay two extra dollars (above the $1,000 of her previous bid) in order to keep the object even if 
she would not buy the same object for $1,002 if facing a simple buying decision. As a result, 
bidders in open-bid English auctions will bid more aggressively than in otherwise identical 
second-price sealed-bid auctions where bidders face only one-time bidding decisions and are not 
subject to the quasi-endowment effect.
2 This is the second hypothesis that we test in this paper. 
 
The design of our experiments also allows us to test the loss aversion hypothesis for sellers. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the seller’s revealed valuation of the object should 
be higher than the average revealed bidder’s valuation. This is the third hypothesis that we test. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In part 2 we describe the design of our experiments. 
In part 3 we use the data collected from these experiments to test the three hypotheses stated 
above. Part 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Experiment design 
 
In total, we conducted 32 experimental sessions each of which involved five subjects and four 
different auctions. Subjects were recruited among undergraduate and graduate students of the 
same university; they were given $25 at the beginning of the session which they were free to use 
for buying objects (if they wished to do so). Subjects were allowed to keep any bought items and 
any money left at the end of the session. Subjects were also allowed to use their own funds if 
they wanted to bid more than the amount they were given at the beginning of the session. The 
objects offered for sale are listed below. 
 
(1)  Monetary lottery awards: Award LA1 was a choice between lottery L1,1 that gives the 
holder a 34% chance to win $24 and lottery L1,2 that gives the holder a 33% chance to 
win $25. Award LA2 was a choice between lottery L2,1 that gives the holder a 45% 
chance to win $30 and lottery L2,2 that gives the holder a 90% chance to win $15 
(2)  Merchandise (travel) lottery award: Award TA gives the holder a 1 out of 32 chance to 
win a 7-night 2-star hotel stay at any major U.S. or Canadian city of her choice (all 
taxes included). 
(3)  Merchandise award - USB: Award USB, a USB memory key 
(4)  Merchandise award - backpack: Award BP, a backpack. 
 
                                                 
2 Consistent with this hypothesis, Heyman et al. (2004) show that bidders who participate in multi-stage second-
price sealed-bid auctions tend to increase their bids as the auction progresses.  
All subjects were given all necessary information about all awards. In particular, subjects were 
able to see and examine all merchandise awards before the auction. In addition, for the USB 
award, subjects were given a printout describing its technical characteristics.  The auction 
designs were as follows (in chronological order for each session). Table I presents the schedule 
for all sessions. 
(1)  Open-bid English auction 
(2)  Open-bid English auction 
(3)  Second-price sealed-bid auction 
(4)  First-price sealed-bid or Dutch auction. 
 
 
Table I: The Schedule of Experiments 
 
sessions  Auction 1  Auction 2  Auction 3  Auction 4: 




1-4  LA2 USB  TA  BP   
5-8  LA1 USB  TA  BP   
9-12  LA2 TA  USB    BP 
13-16  LA1 TA  USB    BP 
17-20  LA2 USB  TA  BP   
21-24  LA1 USB  TA  BP   
25-28  LA2 TA  USB    BP 
30-32  LA1 TA  USB    BP 
 
 
The timeline for auctions 1, 2, and 3 is as follows. First, one of the randomly chosen subjects 
(“seller”) is given the object. Then she is asked to set a reserve price and to delegate the selling 
of the object to the auctioneer.
3 The auctioneer starts the auction from zero and keeps the reserve 
price secret. If the final auction price is equal to or greater than the reserve price, the winner of 
the auction pays the owner (i.e. the subject who was allocated the object) the final price and 
receives the object. If the final auction price is lower than the reserve price, no sale takes place 
and the seller keeps the object. For auction 4 we played the role of the seller ourselves and set a 
zero reserve price. 
 
To insure that subjects correctly understand the rules of the second-price sealed-bid auction and 
its equivalence to the open-bid English auction we framed the second-price sealed-bid auction in 
the following way. Since English auctions were the first two auctions in any session, we told the 
subjects that the rules for the second-price sealed-bid auction were exactly the same as the rules 
of the English auction with the exception that bidders must secretly tell (to the auctioneer) the 
price up to which they are going to bid and at which they are going to stop bidding. Then, during 
                                                 
3 One of the authors performed the role of the auctioneer.   
the course of the auction, each bidder must bid up to her pre-determined amount and is not 
allowed to bid above it. 
 
To obtain the information about the values that each of the bidders in English auctions (with the 
exception of the winner, whose valuation of the object cannot be revealed) assigned to the object, 
we adopted the classical version of the English auction (Vickrey, 1961) in which the auctioneer 
increases the price by a small bidding increment and bidders must decide if they are willing to 
buy the object at the current price or if they want to drop out of the auction. The bidding 
increment was set to $0.25 for the first auction and to $0.50 for the second auction. Dodonova 
and Khoroshilov (2005) argue that bidders in English auctions experience quasi-endowment 
effect because there are time periods during the course of the auction when their bids are the 
highest. They argue that the bidder with the currently highest bid feels as if she almost owns the 
object. In this case, if someone overbids her, she feels as if she is losing the item and considers 
submitting a new bid, paying an extra (small) amount of money in order to keep the object, 
whereas she treats withdrawing from the auction as losing the object. To preserve this feature in 
the classical English auction setting (Vickrey, 1961) we assigned each subject a number (from 
one to four) and, after each incremental price increase, asked only one bidder whether she was 
still willing to bid or if she was out. For example, in the first auction we asked the first bidder if 
she was willing to bid $0.25; if so, we asked the second bidder if she is willing to bid $0.5; then 
we asked the third bidder for a price of $0.75; then we asked the fourth bidder for $1; then we 
went back to the first bidder and asked for $1.25, etc. If, at some point, one of the bidders did not 
want to bid, she was excluded from the auction and we asked the next bidder for the same price. 
For the purpose of our analysis we define the value that any given bidder assigns to the object to 
be equal to the average of her highest bid and the required bid at which she dropped out of the 
auction. This way we are able to extract valuations from each of the bidders in English auctions 
with the exception of the winners. 
 
To prevent any “in-front-jumping” in Dutch auctions (auction #4) based on other bidders’ 
physical movements, the subjects were not allowed to see each other. During the course of the 
Dutch auction, all subjects faced the wall and were asked to indicate their desire to bid by a hand 
signal behind their backs. 
 
 
3.  Analysis 
 
To test the existence of the endowment effect for sellers (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we 
used the data from auctions 1, 2, and 3. For each award we combined the bidding data from 
English and second-price sealed-bid auctions and compared the combined data with the reserve 
prices by using the two-sample t-test. Since the reserve price was kept secret, it did not influence 
the bidding process. Furthermore, in the case when the final auction price was below the reserve 
price, no sale took place, i.e. the winner of the auction was not allowed to submit another bid to 
surpass the reserve price. Therefore, setting the reserve price equal to her own valuation of the 
object was the optimal seller’s strategy regardless of the bidders’ strategies and valuations. This 
information was conveyed to the sellers and each seller confirmed that she understood it. Since  
the winner’s valuation of the object cannot be observed in English auctions, we excluded the 
lowest bidder’s valuation in each English auction session as well. Table II presents the 
descriptive statistics (average bidders’ and sellers’ valuations). 
 
 









LA1  $8.44 $6.51 $1.93 0.021 
LA2  $11.63  $6.90 $4.73 0.000 
USB  $16.52  $8.58 $7.94 0.000 
TA  $13.83  $8.18 $5.65 0.002 
 
 
As Table II shows, sellers’ valuations are significantly higher than bidders’ valuations for all 
awards. The difference in average sellers’ and bidders’ valuations varies from 30% (for lottery 
award LA1) to 90% (for merchandise award USB).
4 Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Thaler 
(1985) show that people usually do not experience endowment effect toward money and do not 
treat the price that they pay for any item as a loss. They do, however, treat the selling of an item 
as a loss. The evidence of endowment effect for lottery awards (LA1 and LA2) presented in this 
paper implies that people treat lotteries with monetary prices as items, and not as money. In 
particular, they become emotionally attached to lotteries and experience losses when they have to 
sell them, even though they experience no endowment effect toward the money per se. 
 
 
Table III: Endowment Effect in Bidders’ Behavior 
 
  Average bidders’ valuation 








USB  $8.70 $5.99 $2.71  0.002 
TA  $7.23 $5.95 $1.38  0.049 
 
 
To test the existence of the quasi-endowment effect for bidders in open-bid English auctions 
(Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Dodonova and Khoroshilov, 2005), we used the data from auctions 
2 and 3 (English and second-price sealed-bid auctions) for items USB and TA. According to the 
quasi-endowment hypothesis, in the case when bidding starts from zero and all bidders 
                                                 
4 Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimate the parameter of loss aversion to be equal to 2.25. In the Kahneman, 
Knetch and Thaler (1990) experiment, sellers valued their objects about twice as high as buyers did.  
understand the equivalence of English and second-price sealed-bid auctions, the bidders bid 
more aggressively in English auctions. Since the highest bidders’ valuation in English auctions is 
unobservable, in order to make the bidding data compatible with bidding data for second-price 
sealed-bid auctions, we eliminated the highest bids for the second-price sealed-bid auctions. 
Table III presents the corresponding descriptive statistics. Consistent with the quasi-endowment 
hypothesis, Table III shows that bidders in English auctions bid more aggressively than in 
second-price sealed-bid auctions, i.e. on average a bidder in an English auction will bid more 
than she would bid for the same item in a second-price sealed-bid auction. 
 
 
Table IV: Regret in Bidders’ Behavior 
 






BP  $9.59 $11.90  -$2.31  0.19 
 
 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) argues that bidders in first-price sealed-bid auctions can regret 
“money left on the table”, e.g. the winner may feel regret if there is a significant gap between her 
winning bid and the second highest bid. These possible regrets make bidders in English auctions 
bid less aggressively. Since in Dutch auctions the second largest bid does not exist, the winner of 
the Dutch auction will never know how much money she could have saved if she had waited 
longer and bid at a lower price. Thus, the winner of a Dutch auction is not subject to the regret 
faced by the winner of an English auction. To test the Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) hypothesis 
that the highest bid in the English auction should be lower than the winning bid in the Dutch 
auction, we compared final prices for these two auction designs for the BP award. The results of 
this comparison are presented in Table IV. Contrary to the Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) 
hypothesis, we find that the average price in first-price sealed-bid auctions is higher than in 
Dutch auctions, although the difference is insignificant.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the implications of several well-established behavioral biases of bidders’ 
and sellers’ behavior in auctions. Consistent with the endowment effect of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) we show that sellers value their objects significantly higher than bidders. 
Consistent with Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2005), who argue that bidders in English auctions 
suffer from the endowment effect, we find that the average value that bidders in English auctions 
assign to the objects is higher than the average bid in second-price sealed-bid auctions. We find 
no evidence in support of Engelbrecht-Wiggans’s (1989) hypothesis that the winner of the first-
price sealed-bid auction can regret “money left on the table”, and thus the final price in the first-




Ariely D and I. Simonson (2003) “Buying, bidding, playing or competing? Value assessment and 
decision dynamics in online auctions” Journal of Consumer Psychology 13, 113-123. 
 
Bell, D. (1982) “Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty” Operations Research 30, 961-
981. 
 
Dodonova, A. and Y. Khoroshilov (2005) “English Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders” SSRN 
working paper number 922534. 
 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1989) “The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions” 
Management Science 33, 685-692. 
 
Heyman, J., Y. Orhun, and D. Ariely (2004) “Auction Fever: The Effects of Opponents and 
Quasi-Endowment on Product Valuations” Journal of Interactive Marketing 18, 7-21. 
 
Kahneman D., Knetsch, J., and R. Thaler (1990) “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem” Journal of Political Economy 48, 1325-1348. 
 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979) “Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision under Risk” 
Econometrica 47, 263-291. 
 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1984) “Choices, Values, and Frames” American Psychologist 39, 
341-350. 
 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1991) “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1039-1061. 
 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1992) “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323. 
 
Knetsch, J. (1989) “The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves” 
American Economic Review 79, 1277-1284. 
 
Knetsch, J. and J. Sinden (1984) “Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: 
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 49, 507-521. 
 
Loomes, G. and R. Sugden (1982) “Regret Theory: an Alternative Theory of Rational Choice 
under Uncertainty” Economic Journal 92, 805-824. 
 
Samuelson, W. and R. Zeckhauser (1988) “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making” Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 1, 7-59.  
 
Thaler, R. (1985) “Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice” Marketing Science 4, 199-214. 
 
Vickrey, W. (1961) “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders” Journal of 
Finance 16, 8-37. 
  
 